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ARGUMENT
Barrus Has Correctly Stated the Issues on Appeal
At the start of its brief, Appellee State of Utah, Department
of Human Services (hereinafter "the State") asserts that Barrus has
misstated one of the issues before the court.
at 2.

Brief of Appellee,

The State concludes that since Barrus admits the evidence

does not support a finding of an express representation by the
caseworker, then there is no further issue as to a representation
being made.

This ignores the law establishing that for estoppel

purposes, the representation element may be established by proof
that a person with a legal duty to speak remained silent, thereby
causing another person to place herself in an unfavorable position
through reliance on that silence.

Utah State Building Comm. v.

Great American Indemnity Co., 140 P.2d 763, 772 (Utah 1943).
It is not enough to say, as the State does in its brief at
page 16, that "[t]he court implicitly rejected arguments made by
Barrus that Freestone had a legal duty to speak to advise Barrus
about the impact of her lump sum DIB payment..."

There is no

indication in the memorandum decision or findings that the court
ever considered whether the first element of estoppel was met by
the caseworker's silence.

While it is true that Barrus did not

allege representation by silence in her complaint, she did raise
the issue with the trial court, after Freestone denied making an
express representation.

In her trial memorandum, Barrus argued
1

that the caseworker, "made a representation, either by her direct
statement that the lump sum would not affect Barrus' AFDC and
Medicaid or by her silence when she knew or should have known that
receipt of a DIB lump sum would affect Barrus' eligibility. R-125.
That same argument was made briefly to the court in closing.

R-

273-74.
The State Caseworker Was Required by Policy To Inform Barrus of The
Effect Receipt of A Lump Sum Would Have on Her Eligibility
Throughout

its brief, the State mischaracterizes Barrus'

argument as being that the caseworker had a duty to advise Barrus
how she should spend her lump sum benefit.

For example:

1.
"Barrus contends that, upon the actual
receipt of her DIB lump sum award, Freestone
had a duty to find Barrus (before she
foolishly spent her lump sum monies) and
advise
her
to
be
careful
about
her
expenditures. Aple. Br., at 17-18;
2. "This letter did not create any duty ...
to seek out Barrus to warn her to be careful
about how she spent any such award, if and
when it was received. Aple. Br., at 18;
3. "[T]here is no support in case law or
statutes for the proposition that . . . the case
worker must do everything in his or her power
to attempt to advise the client about spending
the lump sum wisely." Aple. Br., at 20;
4. "[T]he caseworker cannot compel a client
to budget a lump sum wisely to avoid harsh
consequences for his or her household." Aple.
Br., at 21; and
5.
"It would not serve the public
interest to mandate that Freestone should have
sought out Barrus to advise her to be prudent
in spending her money." Aple. Br., at 24.
The State has missed the point of Barrus' argument.

Her argument

is not that the caseworker should have told Barrus how to spend her
2

DIB lump sum when it arrived; her argument is that once the
caseworker learned that Barrus would be receiving a lump sum, state
policy required her to inform Barrus properly as to how her
eligibility would be affected

and provide her with adequate

information for making an informed decision. This duty is found in
state policy which requires a caseworker to:
1.
Determine eligibility for temporary and
appropriate benefits accurately and timely...
2.
Provide information so each client can
make informed decisions...
3.
Determine with the client which programs
are applicable to her circumstances...
4.

Monitor and redetermine eligibility...

5.
Use all skills, information, tools and
resources available to assist the client.
Utah-DHS-OFS Vol. II § 122. Reproduced in the Addendum to Brief of
Appellant.

In its brief, the State does not even acknowledge the

existence of these policy statements, let alone explain why the
caseworker did not follow them. Had Freestone complied with these
policies and provided Barrus with the correct information regarding
the effect of a lump sum on AFDC eligibility, then Barrus could
have made an informed decision whether to spend the lump sum as she
did, or to put it aside to meet her family's needs during the
three-month period of ineligibility.
The caseworker did not need to know the amount of the DIB
benefits Barrus would receive, nor the exact date they would be
received, in order to provide Barrus with the critical information
she needed.

The statement that, "until a lump sum is actually

3

received by a recipient, a caseworker could only offer conjecture
as to the impacts (if any) that sum may have on a household..."
(Brief of Appellee, at 23) is simply incorrect.

The caseworker

admitted she could have advised Barrus that an SSI lump sum would
not affect her children's AFDC eligibility but that DIB would. See
Brief of Appellant, at 15.
It is not disingenuous, as the State suggests at page 19 of
its brief, for Barrus to argue that even as late as June 28, 1994,
her caseworker could have advised her of the effect a DIB lump sum
would have on her AFDC eligibility.

Barrus had a telephone and

could have been contacted, had the caseworker recognized her duty
under State policy to inform Barrus properly.

Rather than doing

this, the caseworker sent a note asking for more information, a
clear indication that she still did not grasp the effect her
silence would have on Barrus' actions.
Application of Equitable Estoppel Would Not Defeat Public Policy
But Would Actually Promote It
The State is correct that the lump sum policy is designed to
encourage AFDC recipients to budget a lump sum to meet basic,
family needs during a period of ineligibility.

The State has also

acknowledged that not every lump sum results in disqualification—
an SSI lump sum being the best example. See Brief of the Appellee,
at 23 ("Some lump sum payments may be countable as income and
others will not be countable as income.")

However, the policy

underlying the lump sum provisions cannot be carried out, when a
caseworker fails to provide important information needed by a
4

recipient to make a correct decision. In this case, Freestone knew
that a DIB lump sum would result in ineligibility for Barrus, and
that SSI would not, but chose not to inform Barrus1. Without that
information, Barrus could not decide whether to budget for three
months without AFDC or to spend the lump sum on important, though
not absolutely critical, family needs. The State quotes Gardebring
v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 431, 99 L.Ed. 2d 515, 108 S.Ct. 1306
(1988) for the proposition that most AFDC recipients would deem it
prudent to inform their caseworker before spending a lump sum. The
record shows that Barrus made several attempts to inform her
caseworker that she would be receiving a lump sum but without
critical information from her caseworker, she could not make a
prudent choice.
the

Minnesota

The Supreme Court pointed out in Gardebring that
Department

of

Human

Services

relied

on

its

caseworkers "to provide applicants and recipients with oral advice
about the aspects of the program that are relevant to specific
situations."

Id., at 424.

Rather than acknowledge the lapse in communication, the State
seeks to blame Barrus for not somehow finding out for herself what
the effect of a lump sum would be on her AFDC eligibility.

After

months of silence from her caseworker, despite clear reporting of
her

eligibility

for

DIB

benefits,

x

Barrus

was

justified

in

The State even suggests that the caseworker had a duty not to
inform Barrus what the effect of receiving a lump sum would be for
her continuing AFDC eligibility. At one point, it argues that,
"given the intent and purpose of the lump sum legislation and
regulation (incentive to get off the welfare rolls), any imposed
obligation to speak may well thwart that intent and purpose." Aple
Br., at 20.
5

concluding that any lump sum she might receive would not affect her
eligibility for AFDC.
Finally,

the

State

makes

the

application of equitable estoppel

conclusory

argument

that

"would result in a serious

adverse effect on public policy and would defeat the interest of
the government in making public assistance recipients responsible
for their personal affairs." Brief of Appellee, at 24. The State
fails to say what public policy would be affected by estopping the
State from repudiating the representation it made to Barrus through
her caseworker's silence. No authority is cited for the assertion
that the government has an interest in "making public assistance
recipients responsible for their personal affairs."

Even if such

an interest exists, it certainly is not advanced by refusing to
give an AFDC recipient the information she needs to exercise
responsibility.

A better argument can be made that the public has

an interest in seeing that everyone who deals with the government,
whether

on

public

assistance

or

not,

is

treated

fairly.

Application of equitable estoppel would actually promote the public
good by forcing caseworkers to do a better job of assisting clients
like Barrus.

Such a result would increase confidence in state

government and reduce the likelihood of cases such as this arising.

6

CONCLUSION
The State has failed in its brief to offer convincing argument
for not applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel in this case.
The decision of the trial court should be reversed and a judgment
entered declaring Barrus eligible for all benefits she received.
DATED this X?/ ^l day of October, 1996.
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